Framework Paper โ The Method, the Inputs, and How to Run an Assessment
Published: October 2026
Authors: Gireesh Kumar N (Founder & CEO, AvinyaSQ Technologies) & Santhosh Kumar M (Co-Founder, AvinyaSQ Technologies)
Abstract
Quantum computing now sits inside the planning horizon of every enterprise risk function. The public-key algorithms that carry today’s digital infrastructure โ RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography, Diffie-Hellman โ are mathematically vulnerable to a sufficiently capable quantum computer, and the Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later threat model means the exposure is being incurred now. NIST has standardized the replacement primitives; regulators in the United States, the European Union, and India have set transition horizons. What none of that supplies is an answer to the question each enterprise actually faces: which systems, protecting which data, for how long, whether and by when they can be changed, and in what order. This paper sets out a structured, evidence-driven framework for answering it.
Core Argument
Quantum risk cannot be governed through technology substitution alone. It requires a structured, evidence-driven risk assessment discipline that identifies cryptographic exposure, evaluates business impact, models temporal risk windows, assesses migration feasibility, and integrates supply-chain dependency and governance โ producing prioritized, auditable decisions rather than descriptive inventories.
The Three Threat Models
Unlike conventional cybersecurity risks, quantum vulnerability manifests along distinct threat vectors with immediate operational implications:
- Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL): Adversaries capture encrypted traffic or stored data today and retain it until quantum capabilities mature. Any data whose confidentiality lifespan exceeds the time to a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer is already compromised.
- Trust-Now-Forge-Later (TNFL): Digital signatures and certificate chains issued today can be forged retroactively once quantum capability matures, undermining the long-term non-repudiation of legal contracts, financial ledgers, code signing, and identity registries.
- Deploy-Now-Exploit-Later (DNEL): Quantum-vulnerable cryptography embedded in long-lived deployed systems (firmware, OT, automotive, aerospace, critical infrastructure, IoT) that cannot be patched or upgraded in the field without complete hardware replacement.
The Seven Risk Dimensions (D1โD7)
The QRAM framework evaluates quantum exposure across seven rigorous, interconnected dimensions:
- D1 Cryptographic Exposure: Deployed cryptographic mechanisms grounded in observable artifacts (algorithms, key lengths, curves, protocol implementations, hardcoded keys).
- D2 Data Sensitivity and Longevity: Confidentiality duration, regulatory retention obligations, and business criticality across resting, transit, and archival states.
- D3 Threat Exposure: Threat scenarios adapting NIST SP 800-30 for quantum threat actors, attack surfaces, and adversarial motivations.
- D4 Temporal Exposure & Migration Windows: Mathematical time tests (Operational window, Lifetime test, Already overdue, Deadline test) comparing data lifespan against migration lead time and quantum horizons.
- D5 Migration Feasibility & Constraints: Structural constraints, legacy architecture status, crypto-agility maturity, and protocol overhead tolerances.
- D6 Supply Chain & Dependency Risk: Inherited vendor risk, commercial software dependencies, concentration vulnerabilities, and third-party cryptographic posture.
- D7 Policy & Compliance Conformance: Alignment with internal baselines and external mandates (NIST, CNSA 2.0, EU PQC recommendations, SEBI, RBI, DFSA).
The Two-Tier Architecture
QRAM is structured into two complementary operational tiers designed for distinct organizational needs:
- Strategic QRAM: High-velocity, estate-wide assessment leveraging existing asset inventories, architecture diagrams, and system metadata to establish executive baseline risk, business-case prioritization, and strategic transition direction.
- Operational QRAM: Artifact-grounded, granular Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM) analysis delivering system-level and library-level risk intelligence directly into engineering migration sprints.
The 8-Step Methodology
The framework executes across an iterative, auditable eight-step lifecycle:
- Step 1: Scoping & System Identification โ Define boundaries, asset ownership, and regulatory jurisdictions.
- Step 2: Cryptographic Inventory & CBOM Generation โ Enumerate cryptographic libraries, certificates, keys, and protocols.
- Step 3: Automated & Telemetry Discovery โ Validate live traffic, network endpoints, and data repositories against static inventories.
- Step 4: Threat Modeling (HNDL, TNFL, DNEL) โ Map specific adversarial scenarios to sensitive data flows.
- Step 5: Multi-Dimensional Analysis (D1โD7) โ Score exposure, data longevity, and migration friction per system.
- Step 6: Integrated Scoring & Risk Prioritization โ Apply risk matrices to classify systems into urgency tiers (Immediate, Near-Term, Planned).
- Step 7: Preparedness Gap Analysis โ Benchmark organizational agility, tooling, and governance against target state requirements.
- Step 8: Roadmap & Reassessment โ Construct multi-year migration roadmaps, budget projections, and automated reassessment triggers.
Read the Full 39-Page Paper
The complete paper provides full mathematical formulations, scoring rubrics, sample CBOM schemas, and practical regulatory cross-reference tables.
Published Date
17 November 2026